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Does Conditional Conservatism Affect Credit Ratings?: An
Analysis Of Korean KRX Bond Issuers
Lim, Hyoung-Joo* Mali, Dafydd**
1)
Abstract: We examine whether there is a relationship between conditional conservatism and credit ratings.
Credit rating levels are the ‘opinion‘ of credit rating agencies about a firm’s default risk based on financial state-
ments data and corporate governance information. In South Korea, credit rating levels are issued by National
Information & Credit Evaluation (NICE), Korea Investor Services (KIS), Korea Ratings (KR) and Seoul Credit
Rating & Information (SCI), and are used by bond investors, debt issuers, and governmental officials for decision
making and legislative purposes. Accounting practices such as conditional conservatism have the potential to sig-
nal low default risk and financial stability. Accounting conservatism reflects a manager’s tendency to recognize
“bad news” in a timelier manner than “good news” (Basu, 1997). The academic community continues to debate
the merits of conservatism. However, the majority of studies suggest that conditional conservatism is an account-
ing practice with the potential to increase accounting quality (Watts, 2003; Roychowdhury and Watts, 2007; Ball
and Kothari, 2008). In the U. S., numerous studies find an association between level of conservatism and credit
ratings (Ahmed et al., 2002; Moerman (2006); Nikolaev (2007); Bauwhede (2007): Zhang, 2008; Peek 2010).
Therefore, in the U.S., there is evidence to suggest that credit ratings agencies care about conditional con-
servatism as an accounting practice with the potential to influence default risk.
In South Korea, there is evidence of a positive relation between accounting conservatism levels and credit rat-
ings (Park et al., 2011). However, the association between credit rating changes and financial conservatism is a
question left unanswered. Our motivation is to address this caveat. To our knowledge, our study is the first to
analyze the association between conditional conservatism and credit ratings and credit rating changes using the
two most popular conditional conservatism measures. We contribute to the literature by providing an evidence
that conditional conservatism may influence a credit rating agency’s perception of default risk.
We examine if conditional conservatism is associated with credit ratings based on the following; conditional
conservatism is an accounting practice associated with reducing a manager‘s ability to 'inflate' net income; hence,
constraining dividend has the potential to reduce a credit rating agency’s perception of risk. Credit rating agen-
cies issue higher credit ratings to firms with lower default risk. Thus, because firms care deeply about maintain-
ing or increasing their credit ratings, conservative reporting should have a positive a relation with credit rating
levels / credit ratings changes. We perform numerous tests to establish the relation between conditional con-
servatism and credit ratings / credit rating changes. We investigate the relationship between a firm's credit rat-
ings / credit ratings changes and conditional conservatism using a KRX firm sample of 1,310 firm-years from
2002 to 2013. First, we establish the levels of conditional conservatism using the accruals based Ball and
Shivakumar (2005) and the market based Basu (1997) models. The results suggest that firms borrow equity in
the form of public debt are conservative, consistent with previous studies. Next, we use a dummy variable ap-
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proach to examine the relationship between conservatism and credit ratings for investment / non-investment
grade firms. We find that investment and non-investment grade firms have statistically insignificantly different
levels of financial conservatism.
Thirdly, we test if conditional conservatism has a statistically significant relation with credit rating changes.
We find that firms that experience an increase or a decrease in their credit rating levels from period t to t+1 are
marginally more conservative compared to firms with consistent credit rating levels. Next, we test the relation
between conditional conservatism and credit rating increases. Firms with higher levels of conservatism may bene-
fit from a credit rating increase because an increase in conservatism indicates lower risk. We use a dummy vari-
able approach to capture if conservatism in period t has the potential to influence a credit rating period in t+1.
We do not find a statistically significant relation between conservatism and credit ratings for our entire sample.
However, we find that there is a positive relation between conservatism in period t and a credit rating increase
in period t+1 for investment grade firms. Credit ratings have significant implications for a firm’s access to capital.
Firms below the investment grade level (BBB+ and below) are expected to face higher capital costs and face
limited access to investor equity because of legislative restrictions compared to firms with investment grade
bonds (A- to AAA). Credit ratings agencies may reward financially conservative firms above the investment
grade threshold with a credit rating’s increase because conditional conservatism is considered an important risk
metric for firms above the investment grade. Other metrics may be more critical to firms below the investment
grade cut-off.
Finally, we perform robustness checks for our main hypothesis. We find that firms that experience a credit
rating increase in period t+1 have statistically significantly higher levels of conservatism in period t compared to
firms experience a credit rating decrease or remain constant in period t+1, supporting our previous findings.
Taken together, our results suggest that credit ratings agencies consider conditional conservatism when issuing
credit ratings. Firms with higher credit ratings are generally more conservative. Moreover, conditionally con-
servative firms above the investment grade threshold can be rewarded with a credit rating increase(Keywords:
Conditional Conservatism, Credit Ratings, Basu Model, Ball and Shivakumar Model, Investment Grade).
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Ⅰ. Introduction
Credit ratings agencies provide an appraisal of a
firms default risk. Bond investors, debt issuers, and
governmental officials use credit ratings for deci-
sion making and legislative purposes because credit
ratings are considered ‘economically meaningful’
(Boot at al. 2006: Kisgen 2006). Credit ratings
have significant implications for a firm’s access to
capital. For example, firms below the investment
grade level (BBB+ and below) are expected to
face higher capital costs and face limited access to
investor equity because of legislative restrictions
compared to firms with investment grade bonds
(A- to AAA). Thus, considering the importance
of credit ratings for organizational operations, firms
may use accounting practices such as conditional
conservatism to signal a low default risk and fi-
nancial stability.
Accounting conservatism reflects a manager’s
tendency to recognize “bad news” in a timelier
manner than “good news” (Basu, 1997). The pos-
itives and negatives associated with financial con-
servatism are keenly discussed in academic com-
munity. However, the majority of studies find that
conservatism has a positive association with finan-
cial quality (Watts, 2003; Roychowdhury and
Watts, 2007; Ball and Kothari, 2008). In the U. S.,
numerous studies find an association between con-
servatism, credit ratings, the cost of debt and
agency theory (Ahmed et al., 2002; Moerman
(2006); Nikolaev (2007); Bauwhede (2007): Zhang,
2008; Peek et al., 2010). The results suggest that
these is an association between default risk and fi-
nancial conservatism. Therefore, in the U.S., there
is evidence to suggest that credit ratings agencies
care about conditional conservatism as an account-
ing practice with the potential to influence default
risk.
In South Korea, there is evidence of a positive
relation between accounting conservatism and
credit ratings (Park et al., 2011). However, the as-
sociation between credit rating changes and finan-
cial conservatism is a question left unanswered.
Our motivation to write this paper is to address
this caveat.
The purpose of this paper is to test if condi-
tional conservatism, the accounting practice asso-
ciated with reducing a manager’s ability to ‘inflate’
net income; hence, constraining dividend has the
potential to reduce a credit rating agency’s percep-
tion of risk. Credit rating agencies should, in theo-
ry, issue higher credit ratings to firms with lower
default risk. Because firms care deeply about
maintaining or increasing their credit ratings, con-
servative reporting should have a positive relation
with credit rating levels / credit ratings changes.
We perform tests to establish the relation be-
tween conditional conservatism and credit ratings /
credit rating changes. First, we establish the levels
of conditional conservatism from the accruals
based Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and the market
based Basu (1997) models. We find that firms
that borrow equity in the form of public debt use
conservative accounting practices. Next, we use a
dummy variable approach to examine the relation-
ship between conservatism and credit ratings for
investment / non-investment grade firms. We find
that investment and non-investment grade firms
have statistically insignificant different levels of fi-
nancial accounting. Thirdly, we test if conditional
conservatism has a statistically significant relation
with credit rating changes. We find that firms
that experience an increase or a decrease in their
credit rating levels from period t to t+1 are mar-
ginally more conservative compared to firms with
기업경영연구 제22권 제5호(2015. 10) Lim, Hyoung-Joo Mali, Dafydd
- 130 -
consistent levels of credit ratings.
Next, we test the relation between conditional
conservatism and a credit ratings increase. We use
a dummy variable approach to capture if con-
servatism in period t has the potential to influence
a credit rating period in t+1. We do not find a
statistically significant relation between con-
servatism and credit ratings for our entire sample.
However, we find that there is a positive relation
between conservatism in period t and a credit rat-
ing increase in period t+1 for investment grade
firms. This result suggests that credit ratings
agencies may financially reward conservative firms
with a credit rating’s increase. Finally, we perform
robustness checks for our main hypothesis. We
find that firms that experience a credit rating in-
crease in period t+1 have a statistically sig-
nificantly higher level of conservatism in period t
compared to firms experience a credit rating de-
crease or remain constant in period t+1, supporting
our previous findings.
To our knowledge, our study is the first to ana-
lyze the association between conditional con-
servatism and credit ratings and credit rating
changes using the two most popular conditional
conservatism measures. We contribute to the liter-
ature by providing an evidence that conditional
conservatism may influence a credit rating agen-
cy’s perception of risk.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.
Section II reviews relevant literature and develops
our hypothesis. In Section III, we explain the re-
search design and the performance metrics. In
Section IV, we present details of our results.
Section V discusses our additional analysis results.
Section VI concludes.
Ⅱ. Literature review and Hypo-
theses development
Credit ratings are extensively used by bond in-
vestors, debt issuers, and governmental officials as
a measure of a firm’s default risk(Lee and Jung,
2012). Boot et al. (2006) argue that credit ratings
provide an ‘economically meaningful role’ by facili-
tating equilibrium in bond investment. Firms with
a similar credit rating are grouped together as
firms of similar quality (Kisgen, 2006). Standard
and Poor’s (2012) and Moody’s Investor Service
(2009) define credit risk as the possibility or ex-
pectation of financial default. In South Korea, the
four largest credit ratings agencies are National
Information & Credit Evaluation (NICE), Korea
Investor Services (KIS), Korea Ratings (KR) and
Seoul Credit Rating & Information (SCI). These
credit rating agencies provide an independent ap-
praisal of a firms default risk. As a rule, there are
ten credit ratings categories. The highest catego-
ries in descending order are AAA, AA, A, BBB,
BB, B, CCC, CC, C, D; each category from AA to
CCC is divided into subcategories with +/-. A
firm can experience a credit rating increases if
credit risk decreases. If credit risk increases, a firm
may experience a credit risk decrease.
Accounting conservatism has a long history, but
the economic benefits and demands for con-
servatism are still hotly debated(Park, 2015; Lee
et al., 2013). Accounting conservatism reflects a
firm’s tendency to recognize “bad news” in a
timelier manner than “good news” (Basu, 1997).
On one hand, there is evidence to suggest that
conditional conservatism misinterprets financial
performance (Givoly et al., 2007; Detrich et al.,
2007). However, the overwhelming majority of
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[Figure 1] Influence of Conditional Conservatism on Credit Ratings
previous studies find that conditional conservatism
is positively related to earnings quality (Basu et
al., 2001; Chung et al., 2003; Francis and Wang,
2008). Accounting conservatism is considered to be
an important accounting practice that validates fi-
nancial reporting (Watts, 2003; Roychowdhury
and Watts, 2007; Ball and Kothari, 2008) and con-
servatism has the potential to reduce the oppor-
tunistic behavior of managers (Ball and Shivakumar,
2005). Moreover, auditors generally prefer con-
servative reporting due to the potential litigation
risk (Lys and Watts, 1994).
Basu (1997) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005)
have developed models based on the news-de-
pendent nature of conditional conservatism. In debt
contracting, timely loss recognition has the poten-
tial to affect debt covenants and relationships with
stakeholder.
Once a bond issuer’s financial condition deterio-
rates, the borrower can demand immediate access
to their rights (principal and interest)
Research examining the association between fi-
nancial conservatism and debt have focused on the
agency cost of debt. Ahmed et al. (2002) use both
market and accrual-based conservatism measurers
to estimate the effect on conservatism on the cost
of debt. Their results suggest that accounting con-
servatism is associated with a lower cost of debt,
suggesting that accounting conservatism plays an
important role in mitigating agency conflicts.
Moerman (2006) reports a negative association be-
tween timely loss recognition and bid-ask spreads
on traded loans, suggesting that conditional con-
servatism reduces information asymmetry by re-
vealing losses in a timely fashion. Nikolaev (2007)
finds a positive association between timely loss
recognition and covenant intensity, suggesting that
conditional conservatism increases the effectiveness
of the use of covenants. Bauwhede (2007) finds
that the credit ratings of firms in industries with
more conditional conservatism are significantly
more favorable, resulting in lower cost of debt to
borrowers.
Zhang (2008) examines the relationship be-
tween yield spread on private debt measures, and
finds that more conservative borrowers are more
likely to violate debt covenants. Peek et al. (2010)
investigate the demand for conservatism in the
public versus private debt market. They find that
when the ability for external financing decreases,
lender’s demands for conservatism is likely to lead
to increased accounting conservatism. Beatty et al.
(2008) find that in the debt market, when agency
costs are higher, the demands for accounting con-
servatism is lower. Taken together, the literature
suggests that conservatism reduces agency problems.
Hence, there is a very strong possibility that CR
agencies consider credit ratings as a default risk
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metric. Thus, managers may use more con-
servative accounting to influence a credit ratings
analyst’s perception of default risk.
In a Korean setting, there is limited evidence to
suggest a relationship between conservatism and
credit ratings. Kim (2009) fails to find a sig-
nificant association between credit rating and
conservatism. Park et al. (2011) modify the Penman
and Zhang (2002) model, and find a positive asso-
ciation between accounting conservatism and cred-
it rating. However, the relationship between credit
ratings changes and conditional conservatism in an
empirical question left unanswered.
Firms below the investment-grade threshold
have limited access to investors because of govern-
ment or self-imposed limitations. For example,
Rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act of
1940, stipulates limitations to investments for bonds
below the A- level (investment grade bond from
A- to AAA) compared to non-investment grade
bonds (BBB+ firms and below). Credit rating
downgrades / upgrades directly influences a firm’s
cost of capital. Firms that experience a credit rat-
ing increase (decrease) experience cost of capital
decrease (increase). Credit ratings also influence
relationships with third parties such as customers
and suppliers, demonstrates a firm’s stability, and
is a form of signalling to stockholders.
[Figure 1] illustrates the association between
the cost of debt and conservatism, based on pre-
vious literatures. (1) Conditional conservatism has
the potential to reduce agency problems because
conservative reporting reduces a manager’s ability
to ‘inflate’ net income; hence, retained earning is
lower, which constrains dividend. (2) Thus, choos-
ing more conservative accounting is one way to
reduce default risk. (3) Credit rating agencies issue
higher credit ratings to firms with lower default
risk. (4) Firms care deeply about maintaining or
increasing their credit ratings; therefore, con-
servative reporting should have a positive relation
with credit rating levels / credit ratings changes
(Ahmed et al., 2002). Therefore, based on the
above arguments, we develop the following hy-
potheses;
H1. Firms with high credit ratings are more fi-
nancially conservative than firms with lower
credit ratings
H2. Financially conservative firms are more
likely to experience a positive credit rating
change.
Ⅲ. Research Design
3.1 Model specifications and variables descriptions
The purpose of this paper is to establish a rela-
tionship between credit ratings levels / credit rat-
ings changes and conditional conservatism. We de-
velop 10 models to test our hypothesis. 5 models
are based on the Ball and Shivakumar (2005)
measure; (1), (3), (5), (7), (9), and 5 models are
based on the Basu measure; (2), (4), (6), (8),
(10).
First, we establish the levels of conditional con-
servatism from the accruals based Ball and
Shivakumar and Basu models from equations (1)
and (2). In the BS model, a positive coefficient for
CFO*DCFO suggests financial conservatism. In
the Basu model a positive coefficient for 
RET*DRET suggests financial conservatism.
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Conditional Conservatism Model
   
  (1)
   
  (2)
Where1),
TACC : Total accruals
CFO : Cashflow from operation
DCFO : A dummy variable that takes 1 if CFO is
below 0, 0 otherwise
EAR : Net income scaled by prior year total assets
RET : 12 months cumulative stock returns
DRET : A dummy variable that takes 1 if RET is
below 0, 0 otherwise
Next, we examine the relationship between con-
servatism and credit ratings for investment /
non-investment grade firms. We regress the inter-
action terms of conservatism measures with IG (a
dummy variable that takes 1 if credit rating is in-
vestment grade (above BBB+), 0 otherwise) to
compare the conservatism level of investment /
non-investment grade firms. Our variables of in-
terest are the  coefficients in equations (3) and
(4). We hypothesize that firms above the invest-
ment grade cut off will have higher levels of con-
ditional conservatism because conservatism has the
potential to reduce managers’ ability to increase
net income; thus reduce risk. A reduction in risk
may be rewarded by higher credit ratings. There-
fore, we would expect to find a positive relation
1) For our conditional conservatism models,
 captures timely
loss recognition and is the conditional conservatism
measure. The fundamental intuition of this measure is
that firms with high levels of timely loss recognition
have more sensitive earnings to economic shocks
conditional on a bad news. Firms with low level of
conditional conservatism may be 1) firms that ignore
the economic shock or 2) firms that are constrained
by predominating unconditional conservatism.
between conditional conservatism and credit rat-
ings for firms above the investment grade cut-off
level. Based on our above arguments, we expect
 to be positive. To estimate the relationship be-
tween conservatism and firms above the invest-
ment grade cut-off, we develop the following
models:
Investment Grade Model
   

  (3)
   

   (4)
Where,
IG : A dummy variable that takes 1 if credit rating
is investment grade(above BBB+), 0 otherwise
Equations (5) and (6) are designed to capture
if conditional conservatism has a statistically sig-
nificant relation with credit rating changes. The
below models test whether firms that experience a
credit rating change in period t+1 are more finan-
cially conservative than firms that do not experi-
ence a credit rating change.  estimates the level
of conditional conservatism for our sample. Our
variable of interest is  , the interaction term
CFO*DCFO*Change (or RET*DRET*Change) which
captures the influence of conservatism on credit
rating change. Change is a dummy variable that
takes 1 if credit rating changes from t to t+1 peri-
od, 0 otherwise. A positive statistically significant
result would suggest that firms that experience a
credit rating change in period t+1 are more finan-
cially conservative in period t compared to firms
that did not experience a credit rating change. We
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hypothesize that conservatism has the possibility to
influence credit rating change. Therefore, we ex-
pect,  positive.
We compare the levels of conditional con-
servatism in period t and credit ratings in t+1
based on Alissa et al., (2013). Alissa et al., (2013)
suggests that management decisions, economic
conditions, industry trends and management errors
within period t have the potential to distort long
term credit rating; therefore, ‘capital structure ad-
justments may not be timely enough to allow
firms to move closer to their expected ratings’ in
period t.
Credit rating change vs No Change
   

   (5)
   

   (6)
   
 
Where,
Change :A dummy variable that takes 1 if credit
rating changed from to t to t+1 period, 0
otherwise
Next, equations (7) and (8) examine if firms
that experienced a positive credit rating change in
period t+1 are more conservative in period t com-
pared to firms that did not experience a credit rat-
ing change. Moreover, we test the relationship be-
tween conservatism in period t and a credit rating
increase in period t+1 for investment grade firms
compared to non investment grade firms. Based on
our previous argument, we suggest that con-
servatism has the potential to reduce agency prob-
lems by constraining the ability of managers to
‘inflate’ net income. Constraining a managers op-
portunity to ‘inflate’ net income reduces risk. A
reduction in risk may be rewarded by higher credit
ratings. Therefore, we hypothesize that firms that
practice conditional conservatism in period t will
experience a credit rating increase in period t+1.
Our variables of interest are  and  .  is
an interaction term that compares the difference
between the conservatism levels of firms in period
t that experienced a credit rating increase in peri-
od t+1 with firms that did not experience a credit
rating change, the remainder of our sample. We
expect that more financially conservative firms are
rewarded with higher credit ratings. Therefore, we
expect  to be positive.  is an interaction term
that compares the difference between the con-
servatism levels of investment grade (IG) firms in
period t that experienced a credit rating increase
in period t+1 with firms that did not experience a
credit rating change, the remainder of our sample.
Based on our previous argument, we expect  to
be positive because investment grade firms are
considered as firms with lower default risk com-
pared to non-investment grade firms.
Investment Grade & Positive Change vs Invest-
ment Grade & Non_Positive Change
 



(7)




(8)
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<Table 1> Expected Sign
Coefficient Expected Sign
 of (3) & (4) (+)
 of (5) & (6) (+) or (-)
 of (7) & (8) (+)
 of (9) & (10) (+) for Change 1 & 2
Where,
Pos_Cha :A dummy variable that takes 1 if credit
rating increase from to t to t+1 period, 0 if
credit rating decreased or remained the same
Additional Analysis
Finally, we divide our sample into 3 sub-sam-
ples to test if the conservatism levels of our differ-
ent sub-samples (no change, credit ratings in-
creases and decreases) are statistically different in
period t for our three different groups. Change is a
dummy variable that takes on the following properties.
 

(9)


(10)
Where,
1. Positive Change vs Negative Change (186 vs 53)
Change1 :A dummy variable that takes 1 if
credit rating increased from t to t+1 period, 0 if
credit rating decreased.
2. Positive change vs no change (186 vs 942)
Change2 :A dummy variable that takes 1 if
credit rating increased from t to t+1 period, 0 if
credit rating remained stable.
3. Negative change vs no change (53 vs 1208)
Change3 :A dummy variable that takes 1 if
credit rating decreased from t to t+1 period, 0 if
credit rating remained stable.
Our variables of interest in equations (9) and
(10) are  . The  interaction term tests if
there are statistically significant differences be-
tween the behavior of our three samples. In model
1 and 2, we expect the  coefficient to be posi-
tive. We do not make assumptions about model 3
because of our small sample size.
Based on our arguments above2), we expect to
see the following signs for our coefficients illus-
trated in <Table 1>. We are keen to find whether
financially conservative firms are considered as
safer investments with lower level of default risk
hence, are rewarded with higher credit ratings.
Since firms deeply care about their credit ratings,
conservative reporting may be one option for those
who wish to increase or retain credit ratings.
2) (1) & (2) capture the level of conditional conser-
vatism for the whether BS and Basu model for our
entire sample. (3) & (4) captures whether investment
grade firms (Above A- and above) are more conser-
vative compared to non-investment grade firms (BBB
+ and below) credit ratings. (5) & (6) tests whether
firms that experience credit ratings change are more
conservative than firms that do not experience a
credit ratings change. (7) & (8) tests whether firms
that experience credit ratings increases are more
conservative compared to firms with that experience
a decreased credit ratings or firms with consistent
credit ratings (model 1) (7) & (8) tests whether
investment grade firms that experience credit ratings
increases are more conservative compared to firms
with that experience a decreased credit ratings or
firms with consistent credit ratings (model 2) (9) &
(10) are additional tests to add robustness to our
main findings (3 sub-periods com- parison)
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<Table 2> Conditional conservatism sample selection by credit ratings
Panel A: Conditional Conservatism sample from 2002-2013
Initial CR Sample 2,045
Excluding Post periods (710)
Potential Sample 1,335
Excluding firms with no financial data available (25)
Final Sample 1,310
Panel B: Sample selection by credit ratings
CR scores CR Obs CR sores CR Obs
17 AAA 35 8 BBB- 86
16 AA+ 62 7 BB+ 64
15 AA 88 6 BB 51
14 AA- 134 5 BB- 41
13 A+ 99 4 B+ 14
12 A 175 3 B 18
11 A- 144 2 B- 10
10 BBB+ 150 1 Below -B 24
9 BBB 115 Total 1,310
3.2 Sample selection
All credit rating data is collected from TS-2000
and financial data is collected from DataGuide 5.0
or New KisValue. Financial Institutions are ex-
cluded from our initial sample, consistent with pre-
vious studies. Our sample period covers 2002 to
2013. All financial data is collected per calendar
year. Financial Institutions are excluded from our
initial sample, consistent with previous studies. Our
sample period covers 2002 to 2013.
All financial data is collected per calendar year.
<Table 2> illustrates our sample selection proce-
dure. A total of KRX firm 2,045 were included in
our initial sample. 710 post period observations
were excluded and an additional 25 firms were ex-
cluded because no financial data was available for
our conditional conservatism metrics, leaving a to-
tal of 1,310 firms. The sample distribution shown
in Panel B is relatively normally distributed.
Ⅳ. Empirical Results
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation
Panel A in <Table 3> provides details about our
sample’s central tendency and standard deviations
for all variables of interest. Our data is winsorized
at the 1% level, consistent with previous studies.
The results show that the mean (and median) of
CFO and RET are positive, suggesting than on
average firms are profitable. However, 22%(43%)
of the sample firms experience negative CFO(Stock
return) suggesting that there is a variation in the
levels of firm profitability. Panel B shows our
Pearson Correlations. The results show that RET*
DRET(CFO*DCFO) is significantly positively cor-
related with EAR(TACC). Therefore, our sample
firms are considered to be conservative.
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<Table 3> Uni-variate Analysis
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Variables Obs Mean(Median) Max(Min) S.D
NI 1310 0.03(0.3) 0.22(-0.26) 0.08
TACC 1310 -0.02(-0.02) 0.22(-0.28) 0.09
CFO 1310 0.05(0.04) 0.30(-0.19) 0.08
RET 1310 0.29(0.17) 3.48(-0.83) 0.12
DCFO 1310 0.22(0) 1(0) 0.41
DRET 1310 0.43(0) 1(0) 0.49
CFO*DCFO 1310 -0.11(0) 1(0) 0.36
RET*DRET 1310 -0.12(0) 0(-0.83) 0.20
Panel B: Pearson Correlations
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
1. EAR 1
2. TACC 0.53*** 1
3. CFO 0.38*** -0.57*** 1
4. RET 0.02 -0.07** 0.09*** 1
5. RET*DRET 0.32*** 0.08*** 0.22*** 0.36*** 1
6. CFO*DCFO 0.21*** 0.42*** 0.66*** 0.07*** 0.18*** 1
Variable Definition
Where,
TACC : Total accruals
CFO : Cashflow from operation
DCFO : A dummy variable that takes 1 if CFO
is below 0, 0 otherwise
EAR : Net income scaled by prior year total
assets
RET : 12 months cumulative stock returns
DRET : A dummy variable that takes 1 if RET
is below 0, 0 otherwise
4.2 Multi-variate Analysis results
First, we examine the levels of conditional con-
servatism for our sample, firms that have acquired
equity through public debt. Our variable BS_Cons
<Table 4> in model 1 and 2 are statistically sig-
nificant at the 5% and 10% level. The Basu_CS
variable is statistically significant at the 1% level.
The results suggest that overall our sample firms
are financially conservative.
Next, we use the interaction term IG, a dummy
variable to take on the value of 1 if a firm’s credit
rating is investment grade (above BBB+), 0 oth-
erwise to establish if firms above the investment
grade are more financially conservative compared
to non-investment grade firms.
<Table 5> shows that our coefficient of interest
 is positive, but not statistically significant for
the BS and the Basu models. The results suggest
that firms above the investment grade cut-off do
not participate in more financial practices com-
pared to non-investment grade firms. In hypoth-
esis 1, we suggest that conditional conservatism
can be considered as an accounting practice con-
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<Table 4> Conditional Conservatism regression on investment grade
Conditional Conservatism Models
BS Mode 1 :  (1)
Basu Model 3 : (2)
BS Mode 2 :  (3)
Basu Model 4 :  (4)
Ball and Shivakumar Model Basu Model
Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept ?
0.01***
(3.17)
-0.01
(-1.34)
Intercept
0.06
(18.05)***
0.03***
(6.44)
CFO -
-0.59***
(-16.34)
-0.62***
(-17.10)
RET
-0.01
(-4.24)***
-0.01***
(-3.34)
D -
-0.01
(-1.21)
-0.01
(-0.81)
D
-0.01
(-1.63)
-0.01*
(-1.75)
BS_Cons ?
0.20**
(2.48)
0.18*
(1.70)
Basu_Cons
0.13***
(8.77)
0.11***
(6.18)
IG ?
0.03
***
(5.97)
IG
0.03
***
(5.94)
BS_Cons*IG +
0.02
(0.15)
Basu_Cons*IG
0.01
(0.35)
F value 218.66*** 143.39*** F value 57.74*** 45.19***
Adj R2 0.3328 0.3523 Adj R2 0.1151 0.1444
Mean VIF 2.04 2.35 Mean VIF 1.77 2.09
Obs 1310 1310 Obs 1310 1310
<Table 5> Credit rating change vs No change analysis
Conditional Conservatism Models
BS Model :   (5)
Basu Model :   (6)
Sign BS Model Basu Model
Intercept ? 0.01(3.15)*** Intercept 0.06(17.50)***
CFO - -0.61(-16.65)*** RET -0.0.1(-4.20)***
D - -0.01(-1.16) D -0.01(-1.65)*
BS_Cons ? 0.19(2.33)** Basu_Cons 0.12(8.32)***
Change ? -0.01(-3.19)*** Change -0.01(-2.74)***
BS_Cons*Change ? 0.02(1.79)* Basu_Cons*Change 0.01(1.92)*
F value 139.75*** F value 38.28***
Adj R2 0.3464 Adj R2 0.1246
Mean VIF 1.82 Mean VIF 1.66
Obs 1310 Obs 1310
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<Table 6> Positive Change vs Non-Positive Change
Conditional Conservatism Models
 

(7)
 

(8)
BS Model Basu Model
Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept ?
0.02
***
(4.29)
-0.00
(-0.56)
Intercept
0.06
***
(18.63)
0.03
***
(6.95)
CFO -
-0.61
***
(-17.32)
-0.63
***
(-18.08)
RET
-0.01
***
(-3.61)
-0.01
*
(-1.95)
D -
-0.01
(-1.20)
-0.00
(-0.45)
D
-0.01*
(-1.71)
0.11***
(5.57)
BS_Cons ?
0.23***
(2.83)
0.17*
(1.87)
Basu_Cons
0.12***
(7.49)
0.03***
(5.74)
IG ?
0.03***
(6.05)
IG
0.01***
(5.38)
BS_Cons*IG ?
-0.04
(-0.34)
Basu_Cons*IG
-0.01
(-0.38)
Pos_Cha ?
-0.08
***
(-7.23)
-0.07
***
(-6.28)
Pos_Cha
-0.07
*
(-192)
-0.07
*
(-1.74)
BS_Cons*Pos +
0.87
(0.75)
0.21
(0.66)
Basu_Cons*Pos 0.01(0.21)
-0.05
(-0.98)
Cons*IG*PC +
3.74***
(5.54)
Cons*IG*PC 0.12(2.15)**
F value 157.92*** 112.16*** F value 45.76*** 35.89***
Adj R2 0.3748 0.4045 Adj R2 0.1460 0.1808
Mean VIF 1.71 2.02 Mean VIF 1.94 2.33
Obs 1310 1310 Obs 1310 1310
Note) ① Variable Definition
TACC : Total accruals
CFO : Cashflow from operation
DCFO : A dummy variable that takes 1 if CFO is below 0, 0 otherwise
EAR : Net income scaled by prior year total assets
RET : 12 months cumulative stock returns
DRET : A dummy variable that takes 1 if RET is below 0, 0 otherwise
IG : A dummy variable that takes 1 if credit rating is investment grade(above BBB+), 0 otherwise
Change : A dummy variable that takes 1 if credit rating changed from to t to t+1 period
Pos_Cha : A dummy variable that takes 1 if credit rating increase from to t to t+1 period, 0 if credit
rating decreased or remained the same
② *, **, *** denotes significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
sidered with the potential to increase accounting
quality. Therefore, we would expect firms above
the investment grade cut-off would have higher
credit ratings than firms below the investment
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<Table 7> 3 Sub-samples Comparison Analysis
BS Model
  (9)
Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 0.03(3.50)
***
0.01(3.54)
***
0.01(3.53)
***
CFO -0.66(-8.25)
***
-0.61(-15.18)
***
-0.61(-17.47)
***
D -0.04(-1.96)
*
-0.01(-1.31) -0.00(-0.23)
BS_Cons 0.32(1.85)
*
0.25(2.83)
***
-0.20(-2.54)
**
Change -0.09(-7.43)
***
-0.08(-6.77)
***
0.01(2.12)
**
BS_Cons*Change 0.79(2.27)
***
0.88(2.93)
***
0.16(0.70)
F value 30.73
***
130.22
***
155.99
***
Adj R
2
0.3844 0.3644 0.3808
Mean VIF 2.16 1.72 1.68
Obs 239 1128 1261
Basu Model
 (10)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 0.06(8.65)
***
0.06(16.36)
***
0.05(17.11)
***
RET -0.01(-1.86)
*
-0.01(-4.15)
***
-0.01(-2.71)
***
D -0.02(-0.94) -0.01(-1.76)
*
-0.01(-2.13)
**
Basu_Cons 0.14(2.85)
***
0.11(6.95)
***
0.11(7.06)
***
Change -0.09(-5.33)
***
-0.07(-4.51)
***
0.01(1.85)
*
Basu_Cons*Change 0.01(0.23) 0.01(0.31) -0.03(-0.76)
F value 22.83
***
40.65
***
28.60
***
Adj R
2
0.3145 0.1496 0.1023
Mean VIF 2.70 1.93 1.59
Obs 239 1128 1261
Note) ① Variable Definition
3 sub-sample comparison,
1. Positive Change vs Negative Change (Model 1: 186 vs 53)
Change1 : A dummy variable that takes 1 if credit rating increased from t to t+1 period, 0 if credit rating decreased
2. Positive change vs no change (Model 2: 186 vs 942)
Change2 : A dummy variable that takes 1 if credit rating increased from t to t+1 period, 0 if credit rating remained stable
3. Negative change vs no change (Model 3: 53 vs 1208)
Change3 : A dummy variable that takes 1 if credit rating decreased from t to t+1 period, 0 if credit rating remained stable
② *, **, *** denotes significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
grade cut off. However, we do not find evidence to
support this hypothesis.
<Table 5> examines the relation between the
levels of conditional conservatism in period t and
credit ratings in period t+1. The results suggest
that there is a positive relation between
conservatism in period t and a credit ratings
change in period t+1 for both the BS and Basu
model at the 10% level. Therefore, firms that have
experienced an increase or decrease in their credit
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rating levels from period t to t+1 are marginally
more conservative compared to firms with con-
sistent levels of credit ratings. Our results find evi-
dence consistent with hypothesis 2, suggesting that
financial conservatism may influence credit ratings.
Next, we examine the relationship between con-
servatism in period t and positive credit rating
changes in period t+1. Model 1 and 3 (), are
designed to capture if financial conservatism in pe-
riod t has a statistically significant influence on a
firm experiencing a positive credit rating increase
in period t+1 for the BS a Basu models.
IG, A dummy variable that takes 1 if credit
rating is investment grade(above BBB+), other-
wise the value is added to model 2 and 4 (alpha
8) to capture the effect conservatism in period t
on a credit rating increase in period t+1 for firms
above and below the investment grade cut-off.
<Table 6> shows that  in model 1 and 3 is
not statistically significant. The results suggest
that firms that experience a credit ratings increase
do not have higher levels of financial conservatism
compared to firms that experience a credit rating
decreased and firms with unchanged credit ratings.
However, we find statistically significant results at
the 1% level (Ball and Shivakumar) for model 2,
and at the 5% (Basu) level for model 4 for in-
vestment grade firms in period t+1. Our results
suggest that firms above the investment grade
that experienced a CR increase in t+1 are more
conservative compared to all other firms in period
t(non-investment grade + positive change, invest-
ment grade + no change or negative change), con-
sistent with hypothesis 2.
V. Additional Analysis
5.1 3 sub-samples comparison analysis
Next, we perform a battery of tests comparing
the levels of conservatism of numerous firms. The
purpose of these additional tests is to add robust-
ness to our previous finding. In model 1, we com-
pare positive Change with negative Change (186
vs 53); change1 is dummy variable that takes 1 if
credit rating increased from t to t+1 period, 0 if
credit rating decreased. In model 2, we compare
positive change with no change (186 vs 942);
Change2 is a dummy variable that takes 1 if
credit rating increased from t to t+1 period, 0 if
credit rating remained stable. In model 3, we com-
pare negative change with no change (53 vs
1208); Change3 is a dummy variable that takes 1
if credit rating decreased from t to t+1 period, 0
otherwise. Our variables of interest is the inter-
action term, that capturers the difference levels
of conservatism for each group in period t. We ex-
pect  to be positive in model 1 and 2.
<Table 7> shows that only the Ball and Shiva-
kumar models shows statistically significant results
for Models 1 and 2, the Basu model. However, the
remainder of the results are not statistically
insignificant. The results for model 1 using the BS
model is statistically significant at the 1% level,
suggesting that firms that experience a positive
CR change are more conservative compared to
firms that experience a credit rating decrease / re-
main at constant CR level. Model 2 suggests that
firms with positive CR change are more con-
servative compared to firms that do not experience
a credit rating change. Model 3 comparing the
levels of conservatism of firms that experience a
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<Table 8> Sensitivity Analysis
Ball and Shivakumar Model
 

Basu Model
 

Sign
BS
Model 1
BS
Model 2
BS
Model 3
BS
Model 4
BS
Model 5
BS
Model 6
Basu
Model 1
Basu
Model 2
Basu
Model 3
Basu
Model 4
Basu
Model 5
Basu
Model 6
Interce
pt
?
-0.01
(-1.12)
-0.01
**
(-2.12)
-0.01
***
(-2.70)
-0.02
***
(-3.76)
-0.03
***
(-3.78)
-0.03
***
(-3.32)
Intercept
0.04
***
(8.57)
0.03
***
(6.35)
0.03
***
(5.11)
0.03
***
(4.23)
0.02
***
(2.87)
0.04
***
(3.71)
CFO -
-0.63
***
(-17.42)
-0.62
***
(-17.22)
-0.61
***
(-17.03)
-0.61
***
(-16.84)
-0.61
***
(-16.89)
-0.60
***
(-16.54)
RET
-0.01
***
(-3.43)
-0.01
***
(-3.30)
-0.01
***
(-3.40)
-0.01
***
(-3.56)
-0.01
***
(-3.55)
-0.01
***
(-3.86)
D -
-0.00
(-0.80)
-0.00
(-0.74)
-0.01
(-0.92)
-0.01
(-0.90)
-0.00
(-1.17)
-0.01
(-1.08)
D
-0.01
**
(-2.03)
-0.01
*
(-1.95)
-0.01
*
(-1.88)
-0.01
*
(-1.83)
-0.01
(-1.64)
-0.01
*
(-1.85)
BS_Con
s
?
0.15
(1.58)
0.23
**
(2.12)
0.22
**
(1.97)
0.35
***
(2.86)
0.63
***
(3.82)
0.56
***
(2.78)
Basu_Co
ns
0.13
***
(7.80)
0.12
***
(6.53)
0.13
***
(6.36)
0.14
***
(6.38)
0.11
***
(4.37)
0.16
***
(5.55)
IG_A+ ?
0.03
***
(7.33)
IG_A-
0.03
***
(5.87)
IG_A- ?
0.03
***
(7.17)
IG_BBB
+
0.03
***
(6.10)
IG_BB
B
?
0.04
***
(6.71)
IG_BBB
0.03
***
(5.22)
IG_BB
B-
?
0.04
***
(7.06)
IG_BBB
-
0.03
***
(4.33)
IG_BB
+
?
0.05
***
(6.44)
IG_BB+
0.03
***
(4.50)
IG_BB ?
0.04
***
(5.29)
IG_BB
0.02
***
(2.28)
BS_Con
s*IG
+
0.08
(0.75)
0.06
(0.54)
0.00
(0.02)
0.16
(1.26)
0.50
***
(3.00)
0.39
*
(1.93)
Basu_Co
ns*IG
0.05
(1.11)
0.01
(0.41)
0.02
(0.86)
0.04
(1.56)
0.01
(0.56)
0.05
(1.55)
F value
150.12
**
*
147.69
**
*
146.70
**
*
146.85
**
*
143.51
**
*
139.41
**
* F value 50.89
***
47.39
***
45.53
***
44.64
***
40.59
***
38.56
***
Adj R2 0.3629 0.3591 0.3575 0.3578 0.3525 0.3458 Adj R2 0.1601 0.1505 0.1454 0.1429 0.1314 0.1255
Mean
VIF
2.00 2.33 2.44 2.69 4.21 5.74
Mean
VIF
1.88 2.05 2.33 2.75 3.20 4.04
Obs 1310 1310 1310 1310 1310 1310 Obs 1310 1310 1310 1310 1310 1310
Note) ① Variable Definition
TACC : Total accruals
CFO : Cashflow from operation
DCFO : A dummy variable that takes 1 if CFO is below 0, 0 otherwise
EAR : Net income scaled by prior year total assets
RET : 12 months cumulative stock returns
DRET : A dummy variable that takes 1 if RET is below 0, 0 otherwise
IG : A dummy variable that takes 1 if credit rating is investment grade(above each grade), 0 otherwise
② *, **, *** denotes significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
credit ratings decrease with all other firms show insignificant results.
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5.2 3 Sensitivity Analysis
We fail to find that above investment grade
(BBB+) firms are more financially conservative
compared to non-investment grade firms. However,
firms close to the investment grade cut-off may
be considered as having different levels of risk
compared to junk bonds. Since investor types are
classified into 1) risk averse, 2) risk indifferent,
and 3) risk takers, different investors may perceive
risk-reward differently; thus, we use a different
level of risk to proxy ‘investment grade’. Moreover,
investment grade for long-term and short-term in-
vestments are generally different.
As a further sensitivity analysis, IG was re-
placed by 6 more additional dummy variables. In
these regressions, IG is a dummy variable that
takes 1 if a credit rating is above (A+, A-, BBB,
BBB-, BB+, BB)3), 0 otherwise.
<Table 8> illustrates the results of our sensitivity
analysis. The results suggests that majority of 
coefficients are insignificant, consistent with pre-
vious findings. However, BS_Cons*IG for BB+
and BB are statistically significant at the 1% and
10% level respectively, implying that firms above
BB+ or BB are more conservative compared to
firms with below these grades. However, none of
 coefficients for the Basu measures are significant.
Ⅵ. Conclusions
In this paper, we examine the relation between
conservatism and credit ratings and credit ratings
3) For further robustness, we replace IG with a dummy
variable of every credit rating above. However, All
variables of our interest show insignificant results.
changes. Credit ratings are extensively used by
bond investors, debt issuers, and governmental of-
ficials as a measure of a firm’s default risk. There
is a direct link between credit ratings and cost of
debt because credit ratings are directly linked to
bond yield. Accounting conservatism reflects a
manager’s tendency to recognize “bad news” in a
timelier manner than “good news” (Basu, 1997).
Accounting conservatism has the potential to re-
duce the opportunistic behavior managers, and is
considered to be an important accounting practice
that validates financial reporting. Moreover, audi-
tors generally prefer conservative reporting due to
the potential litigation risk (Lys and Watts, 1994).
In this paper, we suggest the following associa-
tion between credit ratings and conditional
conservatism. Conditional conservatism is an ac-
counting practice associated with reducing a man-
ager’s ability to ‘inflate’ net income. Constraining
managers ability to influence dividend has the po-
tential to reduce default risk. Credit rating agen-
cies issue higher credit ratings to firms with lower
default risk. Firms care deeply about maintaining
or increasing their credit ratings. Therefore, there
may be an association between conservative re-
porting credit rating levels / credit ratings changes.
Our results suggest that firms that borrow equi-
ty in the form of public debt are overall condition-
ally conservative. When we compare the levels of
conservatism of firms above and below the invest-
ment grade cut off level, we find that investment
grade cut-off level firms do not participate in
higher levels of credit ratings compared to non-in-
vestment grade firms. However, we find that there
is a positive relationship between financial con-
servatism in period t and a credit rating change in
period t+1 for firms above the investment grade
threshold. This results suggest that firms above
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the investment grade threshold care more deeply
about credit ratings. Firms below the invest-
ment-grade threshold have limited access to in-
vestors because of government or self-imposed
limitations. Therefore, firms above A- have a
higher incentive to practice conservatism compared
to firms below the investment grade threshold, and
may be rewarded with an increase in credit be-
cause of conservative accounting practices.
Credit ratings are directly linked to bond yield,
therefore a firm will have a lower cost of debt if
credit ratings increase. We find a statistically sig-
nificant relationship between conservatism in peri-
od t+1 and credit rating increases for investment
grade firms. Our results suggest that firms with
higher levels of conservatism are rewarded with
higher credit ratings, by proxy, lower cost of debt.
Our robustness checks support our analysis sug-
gesting that there is a statistically significant dif-
ference in the levels of conservatism in period t for
firms that experience an increase in their credit
ratings in t+1 compared to firms that experience a
credit ratings decrease, or have a consistent credit
rating level. Taken together, these results suggest
credit ratings agencies may financially reward con-
servative firms with a credit rating’s increase.
A limitation of our research is that the relation-
ship between conditional conservatism and credit
ratings / credit ratings changes may not be appli-
cable to countries with different legislative and
economic frameworks. Further research may in-
clude comparative analysis of the relationship be-
tween credit ratings / credit ratings changes in
Korea compared to the U.K. or the U.S.A.
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<Abstract>
보수주의적 재무보고가 신용등급에 영향을 미치는가? :
회사채를 발행한 한국 유가증권 상장기업 분석
임형주
*
말리 다피드
**
4)
본 연구는 보수주의적 재무보고가 차기 신용등급에 미치는 영향을 검증하는 것을 목적으로 한다. 1997년 외환위
기 이후 신용등급은 투자자에 있어 매우 중요한 지표로 인지되어 왔고 기업들은 이를 유지하거나 상향 조정시키기
위하여 많은 노력을 투입하는 것으로 알려져 있다. 한편 재무보고에 있어 보수주의는 이익의 질을 향상 시키는 오랜
관습으로 인식되어 왔으며(Watts, 2003), 손실을 이익보다 더 적시에 인식함으로써 보다 신뢰할 수 있는 이익 정보
의 제공을 돕는 역할을 하는 것으로 알려져 있다. 보수주의적 재무보고는 주주들에게 배분될 수 있는 이익잉여금을
낮게 보고 하도록 유도하기 때문에 기업들은 보다 많은 실제 이익을 기업에 유보할 수 있고 결과적으로 이는 채무
불이행 위험(default risk)을 낮추는 역할을 할 수 있다. 따라서 신용평가기관이 만약 기업의 보수주의적 재무보고를
인지한다면 높은 신용등급을 부여할 가능성이 높다. 본 연구는 2002년부터 2013년까지 국내 유가증권 상장기업 중
회사채를 발행한 기업들을 대상으로 보수주의가 신용등급에 미치는 영향을 분석하였다. 구체적으로, Basu(1997)와
Ball and Shivakumar(2005)의 조건부 보수주의 모형(conditional conservatism model)을 이용하여 신용등급 및 신
용등급 변화와 보수주의 수준을 관찰하였다. 연구결과를 요약하면 다음과 같다. 먼저 기업의 투자등급에 속하는 신
용등급을 가진 기업들이 투기등급을 가진 기업들보다 더 보수적이라는 증거는 찾지를 못했다. 추가분석의 민감도
분석에서도 전반적으로 일관적인 결과가 관찰되었다. 둘째, 투자등급에 속하는 기업들의 신용등급이 상향조정된 경
우 보수주의 수준이 높은 것으로 나타났다. 셋째, 표본을 신용등급 상향조정 그룹, 하향조정 그룹, 변화가 없는 그룹
으로 구분하여 분석한 결과에서는 신용등급이 상향조정된 기업들이 하향조정 혹은 변화가 없는 기업에 비해서 보수
주의 수준이 유의적으로 더 높은 것으로 나타났다. 본 연구의 결과는 보수주의의 수준이 기업의 신용등급을 예측하
는데 추가적인 정보를 제공하는 지표로써 활용될 수 있다는 것을 발견했다는 점에서 의미가 있다.
핵심 주제어: 조건부 보수주의, 신용등급, Basu 모형, Ball and Shivakumar 모형, 투자등급
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